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STEPHEN P. MUMME* and SCOTT T. MOORE**

Agency Autonomy in
Transboundary Resource
Management: The United States
Section of the International
Boundary and Water Commission,
United States and Mexico
ABSTRACT
This article examines the organizationalpolitics of the United States
Section of the InternationalBoundary and Water Commission, United
States and Mexico (IBWC). The political basis of the United States Section's success is a function of the unique form of institutional autonomy
the Section has acquired over the years. Its autonomy derivesfrom both
the legal and political elements of its organizational standing in the
executive branch ofAmerican federal government. This "situatedautonomy" has benefitted the development of the United States Section as well
as the IBWC as an international commission functionally focused on
boundary and water issues, but limits its ability to absorb new responsibilities outside this functional sphere.
INTRODUCTION
On March 2, 1989, one of the most prestigious international resource
management agencies in the world, the International Boundary and Water
Commission (IBWC), United States and Mexico, celebrated a century of
successful diplomacy. This diminutive and little-known binational commission, whose respective national sections are headquartered in El Paso,
Texas and Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, can take credit for a host of accomplishments. It is the architect of six major treaties including the 1889
Boundary Convention' and 1970 Boundary Treaty' which fix and regulate
*Professor of Political Science, Colorado State University. Fort Collins, Colorado, Ph.D. University of Arizona, 1982; M.A. Arizona State University, 1975; B.A. Arizona State University, 1973.
.. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, Colorado;
Ph.D. University of Hawaii, 1981; M.A. University of Hawaii. 1975; B.A. Knox College, 1973.
1. Convention on Boundary Waters: Rio Grande and Rio Colorado. March i, 1889, United StatesMexico, 26 Stat. 1512, T.S. No. 232.
2. Treaty to Resolve Pending Boundary Differences and Maintain the Rio Grande and Colorado
River as the International Boundary, November 23, 1970, United States-Mexico, 23 Stat. 373 (1970),
T.LA.S. No. 7313 [hereinafter 1970 Boundary Treaty].
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the international boundary between Mexico and the United States, the
1944 Water Treaty' which apportions the waters of the two major rivers
transecting the international line, the Colorado and the Rio Grande Rivers,
and the 1963 El Chamizal Convention" which settled the thorniest territorial dispute between the two countries in the twentieth century. In

addition, it has presided over nearly 300 lesser agreements."
The Commission supervises and operates three major dams, two hydroelectric power facilities, numerous flood control works, and nearly a
dozen sanitation facilities along the international boundary. The .range
and breadth of the Commission's work spans the entire 1952-mile boundary separating these two great North American republics. An example to
the world of successful functional diplomacy between two countries otherwise divided by history, culture, and great disparity in economic development, the IBWC has rightly earned the praise of the international
diplomatic community. Thus, the centennial celebration is an appropriate
occasion to consider the basis of the Commission's success.
As an international resource management agency, the work of the
IBWC has attracted the attention of students of international relations,

international law, and transboundary resource administration.' Scholarly
concern has centered on the legal foundations of the Commission's power,

its formal authority, and its functional development. Unfortunately, the
political and institutional foundations of the IBWC's power have received
less attention.7 Yet it is precisely this aspect of the Commission's behavior
as an organization that best explains its functional success in the modern
era.
3. Treaty regarding Utilization of Waters of Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio Grande,
February 3. 1944. United States-Mexico. Stat. 129. T.S. No. 994 [hereinafter 1944 Water Treatyl.
4. Convention for the Solution of the Problem of the Chamizal, August 29. 1963. United StatesMexico. 15 U.S.T. 21, T.I.A.S. No. 5515 [hereinafter Chamizal Treaty].
5. Such lesser agreements include the IBWC's Minute No. 242, Permanent and Definitive Solution
to the International Problem of the Salinity of the Colorado River. August 30. 1973. United StatesMexico, 24 Stat. 1969, T.I.A.S. No. 7708 and Minute No. 261, Recommendations for the Solution
to the Border Sanitation Problems, September 24. 1979. United States-Mexico, 31 Stat. 5099.
T.I.A.S. No. 9658.
6. Basic sources on the IBWC are the following: Eldridge, A Comprehensive Approach to U.S.Mexico Border Area Water Management, 4 S.W. Rev. Mgmt. & Econ. 89-101 (1985); J.Mueller,
Restless River: International Law and the Behavior of the Rio Grande (1975); C. Timm, The
International Boundary Commission, United States and Mexico (1941); Timm, Some Observations
on the Nature and Work of the InternationalBoundary Commission, United States and Mexico, 15
Soc. Sci. Q. 1(1932); Jamail and Mumme, The International Boundary and Water Commission as
a Conflict ManagementAgency in the U.S.-Mexico Borderlands. 19 Soc. Sci. J.45 (1982); Mumme,
Regional Power in National Diplomacy: The U.S. Section of the International Boundary and Water
Commission, 14 Publius 115 (1984); Mumrnme, Engineering Diplomacy: The Evolving Role of the
InternationalBoundary and Water Commission in U.S.-Mexico Water Management, I J.Borderlands
Stud. 73 (1986). Piper. Two International Waterways Commissions: A Comparative Studiy, 6 V. J.
Int'l. Law 98 (1965); Smedresman, The International Joint Commission (United States and Canada)
and the International Boundary and Water Commission ( United States and Mexico): Potential for
Environmental Control Along the Boundaries, 6 N.Y. U. J. Int'l. L. and Pot. 499 (1973).
7. Smedresman, supra note 6,at 529.
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This article examines the organizational politics of one of the IBWC's
national sections, the United States Section, in order to better illuminate
the basis of the Commission's success. Its essential premise is that the
United States Section acquired a unique form of institutional autonomy
within the structure of American foreign policy administration which
accounts for its diplomatic effectiveness and the functional development
of the Commission as an international body. The United States Section's
institutional autonomy rests on both legal and political elements of its
organizational standing and behavior and should be understood as "situated" autonomy in relation to the executive branch of American federal
government. Understanding the political basis of the United States Section's institutional autonomy not only helps explain the IBWC's success
as an international body, but is essential for judging the Commission's
future prospects. A brief discussion of the concept of agency autonomy
is given below to inform our analysis of the Commission's behavior.
AGENCIES, POWER, AND AUTONOMY:
SOME GENERAL OBSERVATIONS

Students of public administration have long been concerned with the
concept of agency power. The policymaking activities of any executive
agency, called its "autonomy,"" are vested in both formal authorization
and informal conditions. Formal, statutory authority may bestow policy
discretion on an agency in specific decisionmaking arenas. Formal authority normally delineates the boundaries and limits of agency power in
relation to other government bodies and society at large, and specifies
the conditions under which that authority is effective. 9 In contrast, informal authority arises not by statute, but from the resource endowment,,
substantive functions, political context, and other variable and subjective
factors such as leadership which affect the practical influence and policy
discretion of the agency in its administrative and political environment."
Many scholars have sought to identify the factors which enhance agency
autonomy within the context of United States government." They generally agree that two key dimensions of agency power are expertise and
public, or constituency, support.' Both dimensions of power are best
understood as relating to the informal bases of agency authority, since
they operate independently of, or in addition to, the stipulated jurisdiction
8. E. Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State 8-27 (1981).
9. F. Rourke, Bureaucracy, Politics, and Public Policy 13-15 (1976); K. Davis, Discretionary
Justice 219 (1971).
10. F. Rourke, supra note 9. at 18-20: Davis, supra note 9, at 3-20.
II. See, e.g., H. Seidman. Politics, Position, and Power: The Dynamics of Federal Organization
(1970), P. Woll, American Bureaucracy (1977): F. Rourke. supra note 9, at 13-41: . Nienaber &
D. McCool. Staking Out the Terrain (1984).
12. F Rourke, supra note 9, at 81.
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and formal authority of agencies. In their study of major United States
natural resource agencies, Nienaber and McCool identified various elements contributing to agency power within the domains of expertise and
public support. 3 Among the administrative characteristics they identified
as contributing to an agency's autonomy are: 1) a mission established by
an organic act, preferably one thAt is potentially expandable and prodevelopment, or utilitarian in nature; 2) expertise grounded in scientific
or military knowledge; 3) scientific or military leadership and recruitment
from within the organization; and 4) espritde corps grounded in a coherent
public image, well-defined agency character, and integrated organization.' 4 Among the bases of political, or constituency, support they identify:
1) a large, evenly distributed, and well-educated constituency; 2) concrete
economic interests or defense contracting; 3) a service rather than a
regulatory orientation; and 4) strong congressional or presidential support.'I
Agencies with such legal endowments, expertise, leadership, and well-

defined character are well-poised to execute their mandates and influence
their own development as institutions. The ability of an agency to control
its institutional destiny and shape the development of policy in its domain
is enhanced, though not determined, by the presence of these factors.
These factors must be integrated into coherent strategies which attain and
preserve operational integrity and consistency. This subtle, dynamic as-

pect of organizational influence involves defending agency authority and
legal jurisdiction, establishing and preserving prestige and good will among
beneficiaries of an agency's decisions and routine operations, and prudently altering its agendas to achieve tangible successes. This also implies
rejecting commitments by which the agency must share authority. Such

commitments are risky in terms of operational success and may weaken
the political good will of those impacted, rendering the cooptation and
cultivation of opposing constituencies difficult or impossible.

"Autonomy" is, then, a rather capacious and somewhat misleading
term if taken to mean a total independence from external influences.' 6 It
is unlikely to be observed among public organizations. More apparent
will be a strategic adaptation of an agency's official resources and its
strategic "conditioning" or alteration of its political environment to achieve

its ends. '"Thus, whatever stability, continuity, and operational economies
13. J. Nienaber & D. McCool. supra note II, at 5-7.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. H. Kaufman. The Administrative Behavior of Federal Bureau Chiefs 161 (1981) and J.Wilson.
The Investigators: Managing FBI and Narcotics Agents, C. 6, 163 (1978)
17. H. Kaufman, supra note 16. at 45, and P. Heymann The Politics of Public Management, C.
1(1987)
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may be observed are achieved by institutional leaders and "situated" in
a specific strategic environment. Failure to achieve such operational continuities and successes likewise reflects poor strategic resources and/or
the unsuccessful use of resources to influence the external environment.
Seen from this perspective, the IBWC's location within a foreign policy
institutional environment is one of the crucial elements underlying its
strategic success.
Foreign Policy and the IBWC: The Anomaly of Autonomy
Few arenas in the United States government would seem less promising
a foundation for institutional autonomy than foreign policymaking. While
a sizeable number of independent, autonomous agencies flourish within
the fractionated system of public administration characterizing the constitutional separation of powers, executive authority and central administration predominate in foreign policy. The President's authority is
concentrated here like few other spheres of policymaking. 8 Though the
President must seek congressional consent in the making of treaties 9 and
appropriation of funds,20 and while Congress is expected to advise and
consent on presidential appointments, 2' the President is expected to exert

special leadership in the foreign policy domain.
However, presidential authority in foreign policy has become increasingly fragmented and attenuated. Although the State Department is gen-

erally expected to be the President's special province, its functional
fragmentation, institutional norms, and bureaucratic ?roceduralism often

combine to frustrate presidential policy leadership. 2 These frustrations
have given form to newer, "irregular," and specialized foreign policy
bodies like the National Security Council that respond more directly to
the leadership styles and agendas of individual Presidents.23

Within the State Department, however, decisionmaking and policy
authority function with a considerable degree of hierarchy and formal
emphasis on chain of command. ' Subordinate officials' discretion in all

but the most routine matters is highly restricted. Although policy making
and implementation may be highly fragmented, the authority of individual
offices and bureaus within the department is far from autonomous; if

IS. J.Campbell. The Foreign Affairs Fudge Factory 128 (1971); i. Spanier & E. Ulslaner. How
American Foreign Policy is Made 28 (1974).
19. U. S. Const. art. 1,§2.
20. U. S.Const. art !.§8.
§2.
21. U. S. Coast. art Ii,
22. Rockman. America's Departmens ofState: Irregular and Regular Syndromes ofPolicy Making. 75 Am. Pol. Sci. R. 915 (1981).
23. Id. at 911-912.
24. Id. at 916-918.
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anything, the contrary is true. Agencies are subject to a formidable network of procedural and policy constraints. Even routine decisions require
the horizontal clearance of multiple units before advancing to higher levels
for ultimate approval.' Moreover, the State Department is quite insulated
from "the rough-and-tumble" of domestic bureaucratic politics. Such
political insulation reinforces the proceduralism and hierarchy within the
Department, but comes at a price. As Rockman observed, "officials in
State lack domestic constituencies to help them weather episodic storms."'
Thus, the State Department is generally thought to be inhospitable to
policy autonomy from the presidential establishment.
There is, however, an important exception. Matters pertaining to the
administration of national boundaries have always been something of an
anomaly within the structure of American foreign policy making.' By
their nature, boundaries symbolize the integrity and sovereignty of the
state, and their administration carries significant domestic political implications. The management of boundaries is a key strategic and diplomatic function. The resources divided by boundaries are of direct interest
to domestic constituencies who benefit by their appropriation and management. Moreover, both fixed and fugitive resources divided by boundaries typically require a considerable amount of technical expertise to
administer. These and other factors endow boundary management with
at least some of the important elements that are commonly associated
with agency autonomy.
Autonomy, however, is not guaranteed by boundary administration.
Any number of factors may diminish a boundary agency's functional
authority and policy discretion. Administrative subordination to superior
national authority, assumed in all cases short of supra-national agency
jurisdiction, diminishes potential autonomy. The assignment of specific
functions to different agencies subdivides jurisdiction and diminishes potential autonomy. The division of executive power within a single agency
diminishes potential autonomy, as does ineffective or complacent leadership. Finally, the absence of a supportive constituency or clientele may
diminish the agency's autonomy.
Within the formal jurisdiction of the State Department are a number
of administrative entities entrusted with managing boundaries and trans25. J. Campbell. supra note 18, at 126.
26. Rockman, supra note 22, at 915.
27. The anomaly arises from the need to specify policy jurisdiction over problems that have both
domestic and foreign policy aspects. While the Department of State has formal jurisdiction over
foreign policy, along the borders numerous ambiguities may be found with respect to the specification
of decisionmaking and administrative authority for specific classes of problems. The literature on
United States-Mexico border management is replete with examples of the ambiguities associated
with the administration of binational problems. For several recent examples see E. Stoddard, U.S.Mexico Diplomacy: Its Latent Consequences in the Borderlands (1980). T. Price, Standoff at the
Border. A Failure of Microdiplomacy (1989).
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boundary resources of interest to the United States. Because these functions are international by nature, requiring the participation of two or
more national parties, the prevailing approach to boundary and transboundary resource management has been by international commission.
Such commissions are composed of discrete national sections representing
their member governments, whose policy behavior, unless otherwise stipulated by formal treaty, is subject to the superior authority of their re-

spective governments. Contingent on their specific authorization in treaty
or protocol and the discretion of member governments in fulfilling such
commitments, the national sections of these commissions may be inde-

pendent agencies with standing among the domestic agencies of their
governments. Alternatively, they may be less formally structured, operating as ad hoc appendages to the established foreign policy machinery.
The United States participates on over a dozen such commissions, whose
national sections or representatives are subject to the policy authority of
the President and the Secretary of State (see Table 1).
Of the agencies listed in Table 1, only two have some autonomy from
the executive branch of their member governments-the International
Joint Commission (UC), and the International Boundary and Water Commission (IBWC). The other commissions are excluded because they do

not enjoy sufficient formal authority in relation to their member governfrom their situated
ments or they lack substantial policy discretion arising
2

political relations in a particular country, or both. 8
Of the two truly autonomous agencies, the IJC's autonomy is vested
primarily in its organic act, the 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty,' - which
provides it with special judicial powers to, decide all cases involving the
"uses or obstructions or diversions, whether temporary or permanent, of
boundary waters . .. " with respect to the relevant and defining articles
of the treaty." Its decisions are binding on the member governments in
all cases excepting a tie vote of the Commissioners." The IJC is further
empowered to arbitrate policy disputes between Canada and the United
States, with binding results, though this power has never been utilized s2
28. Virtually all of these other commissions have diminished autonomy arising from the lack of
formal independence from the State Department. small budgetary allocations, limited staff, and
highly restricted jurisdictions. In a number of cases, those of the fisheries commissions, for instance.
the regulatory function of the commissions reduces the level of clientele support for the agency. Thefisheries commissions also suffer from the lack of a permanent administrative post--Commissioners
do not draw a salary and serve on an intermittent basis as required by the Commission. For discussion
of the fisheries commissions see W. Willoughby, The Joint Organizations of Canada and the United
States 82.83 (1979).
29. Treaty Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising Between the United States and
Canada, January 11,1909 United States-Great Britain. 36 Stat. 2448, T.S. No. 548 [hereinafter 1909
Boundary Waters Treatyl.

30. Id. at art. 3.
31. Id. at art. 10.
32. id.: Piper.supra note 6. at 106.
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TABLE I
United States Participation in Bilateral and Multilateral Boundary and
Resource Management Commissions
Major Commissions*
Intemational Boundary and
Water Commission. U.S.
and Mexico
International Joint
Commission, U.S. and
Canada
International Boundary
Commission, U.S. and
Canada
Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission
U.S.-Canada Pacific
Salmon Commission (A)
Great Lakes Fisheries
Commission
International Pacific Halibut
Commission

Number of
Commissioners

Tow/
Personnel

I

275

10,814,000

3

24

2.879.000

1

7

715,000

1986 Budget

2,538.000
2,129,000
4,532.000
721.000

Minor Commissions*
International Pacific
444.000
Salmon Commission
Inter-American Whaling
55.000
Commission
Inter-North Pacific
103.000
Fisheries Commission
North Pacific Fur Seal
12,000
Commission
International Commission
65.000
for the Conservation of
Atlantic Tunas
Northwest Atlantic
60,000
Organization
International Council for
54,000
Exploration of the Sea
*Distinction between major and minor commissions is based solely on whether the budget exceeded
$500.000 annually in recent years.
A) This commission was established in 1985 and assumes the duties of the International Pacific
Salmon Commission, abolished in 1986.
Source: Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1987. Part 8. Hearings before the Subcomm. on Commerce. Justice, and State,
the Judiciary, and Related Agencies of the House Comm. on Appropriations. 99th Cong.,
2d Sess. 957-1150. Fiche No. Y-4.AP 6/:C. 73/21987. Pt.8.
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In all other respects, the functions of the UC are subject to the approval
of its member governments.-3
By comparison, the IBWC's autonomy does not derive from special
judicial powers in relation to its member governments, but is vested in
its mandate s' its technical expertise, its clientele, its leadership, and its
historic and stategically adroit pattern of development. Its autonomy is
distinctly political, a product of its situated relations with the executive
branch, with Congress, and with its domestic clientele in the performance
and development of its assigned jurisdiction and functions.
Unlike the IJC, which in constitution and practice is more of a regulatory body engaged in determining the appropriate utilization of boundary
waters, the IBWC is constituted primarily as a service and operations
management agency." In the United States, these features of the Commission's mandate have allowed consecutive United States Section Commissioners to strengthen its jurisdictional claims and increase the scope
of its functions in cooperation with its Mexican counterpart. The Commissioners succeeded because they adroitly pursued two basic political
strategies. First, they grounded the Commission's actions firmly and
consistently in the authority of its organic act. Second, they assiduously
cultivated a domestic political clientele to ensure the Commission's political security and operational consistency. A closer look at the specific
sources of the United States Section's autonomy helps explain the rationale behind these strategic choices.
THE U.S. SECTION AND THE COMMISSION:
SOURCES OF AUTONOMY
To better appreciate the significance of the United States Section's
strategic orientation as a domestic federal agency, it is necessary to examine the sources of its modern authority. Since 1944, the United States
Section's powers have been vested in the formal jurisdiction of the IBWC
as a binational commission and the informal, or political, relationship
the United States Section has forged with domestic clientele. Each dimension of the agency's authority has contributed to its survival and
growth as well as to the success of the IBWC as a whole. The foundation
of the United States Section's authority is the 1944 Water Treaty. This
document, the basic organic act of the modern Commission, charges the
IBWC with both diplomatic and technical functions. Article 2 of the 1944
Water Treaty specifies that:
33. 1909 Boundary Waters Treaty. supra note 29. art. 10.
34. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3.
35. Smedresman. supra note 6. at 503.
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I.The International Boundary and Water Commission is entrusted
with the functions of its antecedent agency, the International

Boundary Commission, specified in the Convention of 1889, which
provides that all differences or questions that may arise on the
portion of the frontier between the United States of America and.
the United Mexican States of which the Rio Grande and Colorado
River form the boundary line ... shall be submitted for examination and decision to an International Boundary Commission,
which shall have exclusive jurisdiction in the case of said differences and questions.
2. The application of the present Treaty (1944), the regulation and
exercise of the rights and obligations which the two Governments
assume thereunder, and the settlement of all disputes to which its
observance and execution may give rise are hereby entrusted to
the International Boundary and Water Commission....
3. The jurisdiction of the Commission shall extend to the limitrophe
parts of the Rio Grande (Rio Bravo) and the Colorado River, to
the land boundary between the two countries,.and to works located

upon their common boundary, each Section of the Commission
retaining jurisdiction over that part of the works located within
the limits of its own country (1944 Water Treaty).'
The treaty thus provides the Commission and its United States Section
with exclusive authority to maintain the boundary line between the two
countries, to settle all disputes pertaining thereto, and to supervise and
manage all public works expressly situated on the boundary or within
one or the other country which are dedicated to the performance of its
assigned functions. The 1944 Water Treaty further provides for the specific
allocation of the waters of the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers between
the two countries, for the priority of uses to which those waters may be
put in any subsequent decisions related to the need to allocate water, for
the investigation and development by the Commission of any needed
works to be constructed "in accordance with the provisions of this and
other treaties in force between the two governments," for the Commission
to enforce the treaty's provisions, and for the Commission to "settle all
differences that may arise between the two Governments with respect to
the interpretation and application of this (tlreaty. . . ."' These passages
and others provide the United States Section with several sources of
agency power and autonomy. Among the foremost elements of autonomy
that derive from its formal empowerment are I) its exclusive jurisdiction,
2) its technical expertise, 3) its diplomatic expertise, and 4) its administrative independence from the State Department.
36. 1944 Water Treaty. supra note 3. art. 2.
37. Id. at art. 24.
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The Commission's exclusive jurisdiction is the bulwark of the United
States Section's administrative and policy autonomy. Virtually all of the
United States Section's specific policy endowments as an agency may be
traced to it. As seen in the treaty provisions above, the IBWC alone, as
an international commission, is entrusted with the authority to interpret
and apply the provisions of the 1944 Water Treaty and earlier treaties
subsumed therein. Because this mandate is constituted by treaty, it overrides domestic legislation and therefore buffers each national section from
encroachments by strictly domestic competitor agencies. Exclusive jurisdiction also provides the United States Section with a strong presumption favoring its autonomy from other domestic agencies with respect
to other functions which, arguably, are not as central to its basic mission.
The Commission's functions as stipulated by treaty embrace a wide
range of activities of an operational, data gathering, accounting, assessment, and investigatory character that are essentially technical in nature.
The technical cast of the Commission is recognized in the requirement
that each Commissioner be a certified engineer, and that each Commissioner be assisted by two principal engineers, a legal advisor, and a
secretary. " Together, these officials comprise the management team at
each national section of the Commission.
The technical mandate of the United States Section in the context of
its exclusive jurisdiction gives the agency what is, in effect, a monopoly
on the technical data and information that is essential for understanding
and interpreting treaty provisions and discharging the functions of the
Commission. While the United States Section regularly cooperates with
other domestic agencies with whom its jurisdiction overlaps," it remains
the primary repository of specific engineering data and the principal accounting unit for the functions expressly falling within its jurisdiction.
Other domestic agencies are obliged to provide the United States Section
with data necessary to discharge the functions of the Commission.' Such
a monopoly and associated technical powers and functions give the United
States Section considerable authority, which is duplicated nowhere else
in the complex of domestic government agencies.
The exclusive jurisdiction and technical authority of the United States
Section are complemented by a third source of agency autonomy-its
38. Id. at art. 2.
39. Such agencies include the United States Geological Survey in the case of boundary maintenance, and the United States Bureau of Reclamation and United States Army Corps of Engineers
with respect to the management of boundary waters.
40. The 1944 Water Treaty stipulates that -[the authorities of each country shall aid and support
the exercise and discharge of these powers and duties, and each Commissioner shall invoke when
necessary the jurisdiction of the courts or other appropriate agencies of his country to aid in the
execution and enforcement of these powers and duties." See 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3. at
24, 1188.
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diplomatic functions and expertise. As a branch of the IBWC, the United
States Section functions as the lead diplomatic agent of the federal government in matters within its jurisdiction. As noted above, the IBWC is
charged with the investigation and settlement of all disputes related to
the interpretation and application of the 1944 treaty and agreements subsumed thereunder. The IBWC acquired additional diplomatic authority
from the 1963 Chamizal Treaty and the 1970 Boundary Treaty.
The diplomatic functions of the Commission are expressly recognized
in the 1944 Water Treaty which endows the officers of the Commission
with unique diplomatic status."' The Commissioners of each country have
diplomatic status and they and their staffs enjoy all diplomatic immunities
and privileges, with complete freedom to travel and conduct commission
work in both countries. 42 No other United States commission enjoys a
similar distinction.
The diplomatic character of the IBWC endows the United States Section's officials with unique foreign policy expertise. The United States
Section's personnel are in regular contact with their Mexican counterparts
and know the institutional history of diplomacy along the international
boundary better than any other set of individuals in United States government. Unlike foreign service personnel, who rotate in and out of the
Office of Mexican Affairs, the IBWC-United States Section's personnel
are career officials with cumulative experience in the work of the agency.
The Commissioners of the United States Section have traditionally enjoyed unlimited tenure in office. For example, Ambassador Joseph Friedkin, the recently retired U.S. Commissioner, served from 1963-1987, a
sum of twenty-four years.43 These features of the United States Section
,have reinforced the functional expertise of the agency and enhanced its
prestige and authority at the State Department in matters related to its
functional domain.
A fourth source of the United States Section's autonomy as an agency
is the degree of administrative and policy independence from the State
Department that the Section enjoys in the ordinary conduct of the Commission's affairs. Although the United States Section scrupulously emphasizes its formal subordination to the State Department, it has considerable
flexibility in shaping the Commission's agenda, as well as complete
41. Id.atart.
2.
42. Id.
43. By contrast. Commissioners of the International Joint Commission serve variable terms of
office--typically three years. but this is nowhere stated in the IJC's Rules of Procedure or the 1909
Boundary Waters Treaty--and with the exception of the section Chairman are seldom reappointed.
Section Chairmen themselves do not serve lengthly terms of office and their reappointment is
determined primarily by political considerations. The IJC's Section Chairmen do draw a regular
salary, unlike their peers who are compensated on the basis of the time they devote to the Section's
duties. Interview with David Chandler, Legal Advisor to the United States Section of the International
Joint Commission, in Washington, D.C. (July 16. 1980). See also W. Willoughby, supra note 28,
at 18.
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independence in administrative matters. Under the Commission's procedural rules, matters concerning jurisdiction or the application and interpretation of the treaties are brought directly to the Commission and need
not be channeled first through the State Department." The United States

Section does have the responsibility to inform the department of its activities, and the department may place concerns on the Commission's
agenda.4' The Department's approval is required for all policy decisions
taken by the Commission as an international body. ' In all routine matters,
however, which comprise the vast majority of the Commission's concerns,
the United States Section has a virtually independent role in shaping the
IBWC's agenda.
The United States Section has, however, exercised its policy autonomy
judiciously, assuming the role of mediator between the Department of
State and other domestic interests and conservatively limiting its functional claims to the express terms of the treaty. While its conservatism
has been criticized by those who would prefer to see the Commission
innovate by developing a more comprehensive environmental management regime, its caution has helped sustain the support of the State
Department for its independent initiative and self-management along the
border.
The evidence of this is seen in the United States Section's unusually
broad range of administrative and operational functions. In 1932, during
its earlier incarnation as the International Boundary Commission (IBC),
the United States Section acquired exclusive operational authority over
the construction of mandated international works, independent control
over its payroll, procurement, and retention of consultants, and other
discretionary authority that might be justified in the discharge of its functions." These authorizations were not made "through the Secretary of
State," but were conferred directly on the United States Commissioner,
who has the statutory status as "head of agency."" The IBWC'S authority
was subsequently carried over and reinforced in the contemporary era by
the 1944 Water Treaty which gives the IBWC exclusive authority to
44. The United States Section's independence in such matters is both a function of its formal
mandate and informal practice. As seen above, the 1944 Water Treaty gives the Commission authority
to collect data and information, summon witnesses, and employ the courts in matters related to its
jurisdiction. It also empowers the Commission to establish its own rules and regulations to govern
its procedure subject to the approval of its member governments. And it provides that decisions of
the Commission are binding on the two governments if a communication of approval or disapproval
by one of the other party is not received within thirty days of any decision. The effect of these
provisions is to give the Commission the power of initiative in conducting its affairs and, conversely,
to make the State Department's role a reactive rather than assertive role in policy development. See.

1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3. art. 24; M. Whiteman, 3 Dig. Int'l. L. 712 (1964).
45. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 24.
46. Id. at art. 2; Id.at art. 5, 25, 29.
47. Dep. of State Mcm. (June 18, 1954). U. S. Nat'l. Archives, Record Group 49, 611-12311/
4-1354. (Administrative Relationships between Departmental Offices and the U.S. Section. Int'l.
Boundary & Water Comm'n. United States-Mexico.
48. Id.
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"construct works agreed upon and to supervise their construction, and
to operate and maintain such works or to supervise their operation and

maintenance, in accordance with the domestic laws of each country." 49
No other commission to which the United States is party enjoys such
direct administrative and operational control over public works.
Together, then, these formal sources of agency power provide the
United States Section with substantial policy initiative and discretion in
the conduct of its boundary maintenance and water management functions

along the United States-Mexican border. They are complemented by informal bases of agency authority which derive from the political relations
the agency has cultivated with domestic clientele. The ability of the United
States Section to serve a domestic clientele directly through diplomacy,
dispute settlement, and the provision of tangible public works has been
instrumental in the functional development of the IBWC since 1944. It
is also a key source of the United States Section's institutional and policy
autonomy. Since the signing of the 1944 Water Treaty, the IBWC's functional competence increased beyond boundary rectification, flood control,
and maintenance to embrace an array of water management concerns.
The 1944 Water Treaty provided the IBWC with jurisdiction over water
storage and apportionment along the Rio Grande and Colorado rivers, as
well as an expanded mandate in its previous functional domain. Since
the Treaty was signed, the IBWC acquired new functions in the areas of
water quality and border sanitation, salinity, and the allocation of unapportioned groundwater resources."
The functional expansion of the Commission is based on the mutual
support of its member governments. In the United States, this support. is
contingent on the political support of the United States Section's domestic
clientele. It is here that the United States Section's operational functions
and leadership provide leverage in defense of the agency's administrative
powers and its functional development as part of the Commission.
Although the United States Section's activities on behalf of the Commission are relatively small by comparison with major public works
agencies like the Army Corps of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation,
the agency does provide concrete material benefits to the border states.
Between 1947 and 1980, the agency invested nearly 236 million dollars
in border states in various public works activities; 98 percent of this sum
was directed to projects located in the state of Texas.' Successive Commissioners have energetically lobbied for the United States Section, working closely with the border states' governors and their congressional
49. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art. 24.
50. Jamail and Mumme. supra note 6, at 57-60.
51. See Mumme. Regional Power in National Diplomacy, supra note 6. at 124, table I.
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delegations. 2 While the United States Section has maintained a low profile
with the general public along the border, it has effectively cultivated the
support of the elite political clientele that is crucial to decisionmaking
affecting the Commission's functions. In so doing, the agency managed
to accomplish what few other United States sections of international
commissions have done-build a strong base of domestic support for the
discharge of its international functions.
Such clientele relationships have arguably held the United States Section captive to its domestic constituency and prevented it from pursuing
a broader agenda of comprehensive environmental planning along the
United States-Mexican border, 3 This criticism has some foundation. The
United States Section's boundary management approach, like that of the
Commission as a whole, has proceeded on an ad hoc, non-comprehensive
basis. The United States Section has been reluctant to advocate the Commission's functional expansion in areas that do not have a referential basis
in the 1944 Water Treaty. The United States Section has been particularly
reluctant to assume functions like air quality or hazardous waste regulation
which fall outside the functional limits of present treaty language, and
which would introduce a regulatory component into the agency's fundamental distributive and service missions. The Section. however, has
never enjoyed a formal mandate for comprehensive boundary management and is highly sensitive to the practical political limitations associated
with functional expansion. By carefully cultivating border state interests,
it has kept pace with its clientele in dealing with matters on its diplomatic
and operational agenda. This attentiveness to local concerns has enhanced
the regional reputation of the agency and the Commission as a-whole. It
has enabled the United States Section to garner state support in Congress
for new initiatives that are based on the language of the 1944 Water Treaty
or which may be reasonably extrapolated from that Treaty.
No better example exists of benefits accruing from careful nurturing
of clientele support than the settlement of the highly controversial and
enduring binational dispute over the El Chamizal zone between the City
of El Paso, Texas and Ciudad Juarez, Chihuahua. This dispute, which
successive United States and Mexican administrations had labored to
52. Interviews with border states' congressmen in 1980 indicated that then Commissioner Joseph
Friedkin routinely visited each border state congressman at least once a year. often more frequently.
to brief them on the ongoing work of the IBWC and its United States Section. These congressmen
were unanimous in their praise for the United States Section's relations with the Congress. Congressman interviewed were Morris Udall (Arizona), Robert Stump (Arizona). Lionel Van Deerlin
(California), Clair Burgener (California). Harold Runnels (New Mexico), and Richard White (Texas).
53. See. Utton. Overview, 22 Nat. Res. J. 735 (1982); Bath. U.S.-Mexico Experience in Managing
Transboundar' Air Resources: Problems. Prospects, and Recommendationsfor the Future, 22 Nat.
Res. J. 1147 (1982); M. Jamail and S. Uilery, International Water Use Relations along the Sonoran
Desert Borderlands 18-21 (1979).
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resolve since 1911 ,was finally settled in 1963. " Its settlement is attributable to the United States Section's ability to fashion a solution based
on the distribution of material benefits which secured the support of Texas'
congressional delegation-a fundamental condition for the treaty's acceptance by Congress." The United States Section's twin strategies of
conservatively grounding its functional claims in the organic language of
the 1944 Water Treaty and cultivating a strongly supportive political
clientele have enabled the Section to make the most of its intrinsic powers
under the 1944 Water Treaty. Although the Section functions subject to
the policy authority of the Department of State, it enjoys a wide range
of policy initiative. Moreover, it is strategically placed in the policy chain
to function as a broker between the State Department and its border state
clientele, and as a strong advocate of border state interests. The "situated
autonomy" of the United States Section has been evident in the agency's
capacity to avoid overt politicization, to resist functional predation, and
to evade functional initiatives that threatened to impair the credibility and
effectiveness of the IBWC as a commission.
THE UNITED STATES SECTION'S AUTONOMY IN ACTION
Since its inception in 1889, the IBWC has acquired an international
reputation as a successful transnational resource management body. Its
functions have steadily broadened, developing from a single purpose
boundary 'management commission in the early years to a multifunctional
boundary and water management agency today. Most of its functional
development has come in the modem, post 1944, phase of the Commission's history. That the Commission has grown and .prospered as an
organization during these years is attributable in large part to the strategic
leadership of the United States Section.
The legal and administrative autonomy of the United States Section
and its value to the Commission as a whole is evident in various respects.
Insofar as autonomy has increased the viability of the United States
Section's activities and strengthened its role in transboundary resource
management along the border, it has contributed to the functional development of the Commission. More specific evidence of autonomy in
action is needed, however, to avoid the pitfall of overgeneralization.
Although a number of examples may be cited, the autonomy of the United
States Section is most evident in three areas crucial to the Commission's
success. First, the United States Section has avoided overt politicization
that might reduce its functional effectiveness. Second, the United States
54. A. Lambom and S. Mumme, Statecraft. Domestic Politics, and Foreign Policy Making: The
El Chamizal Dispute (1988); Jessup, El Chamiizal, 67 Am. J.Int'l. L. 423 (1973).
55. A. Lambom and S. Mumme, supra note 54. at 130.
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Section has resisted functional predation by other domestic agencies. And
third, the United States Section has disencumbered itself of domestic

obligations that might impair the credibility and effectiveness of the IBWC
as a commission.
Avoiding Politicization
The institutional autonomy of the United States Section has insulated
the agency and the Commission from excessive and debilitating politicization. The requirement that Commissioners each be licensed engineers
with professional expertise' was explicitly included in the Commission's
organic act as a hedge against using the Commission as a source of
patronage. United States Commissioners, once nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate, have enjoyed life tenure in their positions." Appointments on the Mexican side have more recently been
susceptible to political considerations but likewise tend to defy the norm
in Mexico's foreign service with longer durations of tenure."8
Avoidance of politicization has served the IBWC well in three respects.
First, it has supplied the Commission with continuity in leadership. This
resulted in fewer disruptions in agency administration, the accumulation
of expertise related to the Commission's functions, and more skillful
management of interpersonal diplomacy between the two national sections
of the IBWC. Second, it has enabled successive United States Commissioners to cultivate the border clientele with an eye to the best interests
of the United States Section as a binational agency, rather than a partisan
prize. Overt politicization could damage the bipartisan support of the
agency's border state clientele. Third, it has enhanced the prestige of the
United States Section and the Commission. By emphasizing the Commission's technical activities and expertise, successive commissioners
have successfully deflected attention from its diplomatic and political
functions. While the United States Section through the Commission enjoys a dominant role in policy development within its jurisdiction, its
56. 1944 Water Treaty, supra note 3, art 2.
57. The tenure of IBWC Commissioners is nowhere specified in treaty. The pattern of unlimited
tenure, however, was set during the earlier phase of the United States Sections development prior
to 1944 and has been continued since.
58. Mexican Commissioners have served varied terms ranging from a few months to 32 years.
It is common, however, for Mexican Commissioners to exceed the typical foreign service assignment
of thn years even though they are more directly integrated into the Mexican foreign service than
their United States Section collegues. Since 1947. only four men have served at head of the Mexican
Section. The longest term of office was held by Ambassador David Herrera Jordan who held his
post for 32 years. retiring in 1979. For background on the Mexican Commission see. International
Boundary and Water Commission, United States Section. Chronological Outline of the Various
International Boundary and/or Water Commissions with an Index to Pertinent Treaties. 1848-1970
(1972). (A xerox copy of this unpublished paper may be obtained from the United States Section
office in El Paso, Texas.)
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apolitical image helps the agency play down its policy independence,
strengthening the IBWC's effectiveness as a binational commission.
Resisting Predation by Other Domestic Agencies
The United States Section's autonomy is evident in its ability to defend
its organizational integrity against the predatory initiatives of other domestic agencies. Over the years various critics of the agency have recommended transferring its operational functions to either the Army Corps
of Engineers or the Bureau of Reclamation, arguing that these operational
functions were redundant with the operational capacities of those agencies, and hence, duplicatory and inefficient.
The principal initiative in this regard occured shortly after the modern
Commission was established in 1944. Officials in the Bureau of Reclamation, utilizing the opportunity afforded by the Hoover Commission on
Administrative Reform, argued that the United States Section's operational, non-diplomatic functions could be better performed by the Bureau.
In March 1949, the Hoover Commission recommended transferring the
United States Section's operational functions to the Bureau of Reclamation." With the support of powerful allies in Congress, and the intervention of Secretary of State Dean Acheson, the United States Section
successfully forestalled implementation of the Hoover Commission recommendations. The Bureau of Reclamation continued to press for transfer, and in 1953, the Rockefeller Committee (President's Advisory
Committee on Governmental Organization) affirmed the earlier recommendation to President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Eisenhower signed the
recommendation on March 14, 1953.'
The fight over the United States Section's operational functions then
continued in Congress, pitting the Bureau of the Budget and the Department of the Interior against the State Department and the United States
Section. The United States Section's primary line of defense rested on
59. Letter from Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget. Rowland Hughes, to Secretary of
State, John Foster Dulles (Nov. 16, 1953) (available in United States National Archives, Record
Group 49, 611.1231/I 1-1653.) It should be noted that the Hoover Commission's recommendation
came on the heels of a 1947 Budget Bureau initiative to transfer the U.S. Section's operational

functions to the Bureau of Reclamation. This proposal was also successfully resisted. See Department
of State. Memorandum of Conversation on Proposed separation of the International Boundary and

Water Commission from the Department of State (October 26, 1948) (available in United States
National Archives, Record Group 49, 711.12153110-26-48), Department of State, Memorandum,
Papers Relating to Efforts by the Bureau of the Budget to Assign to the Bureau of Reclamation

Certain Functions of the United States Section, International Boundary and Water Commission
(October 28, 1947) (available in United States National Archives, Record Group 49, 711.12153/102247); and letter from Acting Secretary of State Robert A. Lovett to Director of the Bureau of the
Budget, James E. Webb (December 18, 1947) (available in United States National Archives, Record
Group 49. 711.12153/12-1847).
60. Letter from Hughes to Dulles, supra note 59,
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its claim to a unique jurisdictional endowment and the performance of

functions stipulated in the 1944 Water Treaty. The Hoover Commission's
recommendations assumed the feasibility and practicability of separating
the diplomatic and operational functions of the United States Section.
The agency and its mentor, the Department of State, took the opposite
tack, arguing first that the two functions were logically and practically
joined under the 1944 Water Treaty and, second, that any division of
labor contemplated by the Hoover Commission would require a fundamental revision of the treaty. It would, therefore, run afoul of the many
international and domestic pitfalls of treaty negotiations and ratification
in Mexico and in the United States.
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles' reply to the Budget Bureau's
inquiry on the status of the United States Section reveals how the Section's
autonomy has insulated it from domestic political threat. The Secretary
argued that:
The treaty of 1944 precludes the administrative transfers you mention. While an attempt could be made to amend the treaty, it would
not be in the interest of the United States to propose a modification,
and Mexico would be almost certainly unwilling to renegotiate it in
a manner satisfactory to the United States. Even if amendment of
the treaty were feasible, I would be opposed to the attempt on both
administrative and foreign policy grounds.
Sixty years of experience have demonstrated the value of the Commission as presently organized and supervised. The Department exercises foreign policy supervision over the United States Section,
which is otherwise independent and an integral part of the international body. This experience over engineering matters has proven to
be indispensable to the fulfillment of the Commission's responsibilities. Through it is realized the location of an international operation
outside the Department and in an agency where it can be handled
most effectively, while the Department retains direct control over
foreign policy and foreign relations. 6'
On these grounds, the United States Section, supported by the Department
of State, reversed the Eisenhower administration's decision to transfer its
functions to the Interior Department.
The dispute also provided an opportunity to clarify the United States
Section's organizational status within the executive establishment. In
defense of the unique operational powers of the United States Section,
an internal review of the agency's status by the Legal Office of the State
61. Letter from Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to Deputy Director of the Bureau of the
Budget. Rowland Hughes (Dec. 18. 1953) (available in United States National Archives, Record
Group 49, 611.12311/ !-1653).
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Department found that "the pertinent treaties and statutes do not clearly

indicate the organizational status of the U.S.-IBWC within the Executive
branch of the Government. ...

"62

It further found that "it is necessary

to ascertain as nearly as possible the intent of Congress in this respect." 6'
The Legal Advisor concluded that, "[w]eighing all the circumstances,
the Legal Advisor's office is of the opinion that U.S.-IBWC is not sufficiently independent to be classed as an 'independent agency' in the sense
that term is used in statutes and Executive Orders, yet there is sufficient
independence provided for in administrative matters that it cannot be
considered as an organizational part of the Department. "" Thus, the
United States Section retained its operational functions.
In sum, relying on the State Department as its policy patron and its
border clientele for reliable political support has provided the agency with
a unique and exclusive organizational niche. The United States Section's
capacity to defend its jurisdiction and functions has both drawn upon its
organizational autonomy as created by treaty and reinforced that autonomy
in the process. In doing so it has strengthened the Commission as an
international body.
Avoiding Unwanted Functions
In addition to avoiding politicization and predation by other federal
agencies, the organizational autonomy of the United States Section has
likewise enabled the agency to avoid functions that might have hindered
the diplomatic effectiveness of the Commission. The case of the ill-fated
United States border fence is a worthwhile illustration.
In 1935, the United States Section was authorized to undertake the
construction of a land boundary fence extending from San Diego, California to El Paso, Texas.' The ostensible purpose of the fence, which
had only lukewarm support by agency officials, was to stop the spread
of equine encephalitis and, more controversially, to regulate transit across
the international line.' Shortly after construction of the fence began,
agency officials recognized the volatility of the border fence as a symbol
of unilateral and uncooperative relations between the two countries and
sought to divest themselves of its jurisdiction. When several domestic
agencies, including the Department of Agriculture, the Customs Service,
and the Immigration Service, expressed an interest, the United States
Section quickly lent its support to divestment. Section officials felt the
fence was a strictly domestic function since it did not have the support
62. Dept. of State Mem. (June 18, 1954), supra note 47.
63. Id.
64. Id.

65. M. Whiteman, supra note 44, at 703.
66. Id.
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of the Mexican government and was located three feet inside United
States' soil. Further, the United States Section regarded the fence controversy as drawing adverse attention to the Commission as a whole. The
United States Commissioners persuaded their border clientele of the wisdom of divestment and passed jurisdiction to the Department of Agriculture and the Immigration Service in 1951. The subsequent bilateral
imbroglio over the border fence, which became tainted with racism and
anti-Mexicanism in the "tortilla curtain" controversy of the mid-1970s,
their decision.'
amply
justified
In sum,
the United States Section's policy autonomy and independence
as a resource management agency within the complex of American federal
agencies has fortified the agency's jurisdictional claims, enhanced its
prestige, and enabled the United States Section to effectively advocate
the functional growth of the Commission. Autonomy has thus buttressed
the functionalist logic underlying the Commission's fundamental purpose.
SITUATED AUTONOMY AND THE FUTURE OF THE COMMISSION
The situated autonomy of the United States Section is central to an
understanding of its success and effectiveness as an agency, and to an

explanation of the Commission's success as a transboundary resource
management agency cut in the functionalist mold. As seen above, the
United States Section's political autonomy has enabled it to assume new
functions, to defend its jurisdiction and functional turf, to divest itself of
harmful activities, and to avoid politicization. Each of these achievements
strengthens the institutional capacity of the IBWC as a whole.
The United States Section's political autonomy is the product of certain
institutional endowments and context-specific strategies employed by the
agency to maximize its influence in this policy arena. More than most
areas of policy formation, the boundary and water arena draws together
every level of government, international and domestic, national, state
and local in the process of policy development. Within this decentralized,
fragmented milieu, the United States Section has acquired a substantial
degree of policy autonomy by asserting its claim to an exclusive jurisdiction, stressing its technical expertise, conservatively interpreting its
functional entitlements, and solicitously cultivating the support of its
border state clientele.
Drawing on the IBWC's specialized treaty mandate and the unique
powers conferred upon the Commission as a whole, the Section's leadership has astutely pursued strategies of agency survival which reinforce
the reputation and policy authority of the agency and avoid debilitating
67. E. Stoddard, 0. Martinez, and M. Martinez.Lasso, El Paso-Ciudad Juarez Relations and
the Tortilla Curtain: A Study of Local Adaptation to Federal Border Policies (1979).
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controversies that might tanmish its prestige and reduce public support for
its core administrative functions. In the process, the United States Section
has acquired a range of administrative and operational functions and a
level of policy independence from its ostensible superior, the Department
of State, that is extraordinary among the permanent international commissions to which the United States is a party.
The situated political autonomy of the United States Section has proven
to be an important asset for the IBWC as a binational resource management agency. Its policy autonomy has reinforced the United States Section's diplomatic capabilities, particularly its capacity to take the initiative
in monitoring, responding, and setting the agenda with respect to transboundary resource problems arising within its jurisdiction. It has assured
policy creativity in the discharge of the Commission's functions and has
enhanced the ability of the two national sections to perform this role with
minimal controversy and a high level of public confidence in the Commission's overall approach to border diplomacy. The strength of the United
States Section in dealing with its nominal policy superiors has, in fact,

strengthened the position of its Mexican counterpart in dealings with its
own government." Most important, the accumulation of political auton-

omy in this context has enabled the Commission to manuever politically
in ways that reinforce its basic jurisdiction, grounding old and new functions on the solid bedrock of reliable constituency support.
The United States Section's political autonomy is nevertheless a con-

text-bound autonomy that limits its capacity to absorb functions presently
outside the framework of its formal jursidiction. The Commission's agenda
has shifted from its earlier involvement in the development of large

reclamation projects to a contemporary preoccupation with operations and
maintenance. 6' The most active new sphere of policy development has
been in the field of transboundary sewage and sanitation management.
Here, through extrapolation of treaty language, the Commission's functions have been extended to deal with virtually all classes of transboundary
water pollution. ' The Commission has likewise seen its functions broad68. The United States Section's prominence as a diplomatic broker between the border states and
the federal government in arranging boundary and water agreements with Mexico has focused greater
attention on the Mexican Section within the Mexican Foreign Ministry. The Mexican Section, and
its supervisory body. the Directorate General for Boundaries and International Rivers, are administratively seperate from the Directorate General for North America which deals with bilateral affairs.
See L. Koslow, Mexican Foreign Policy Decision-Making: The Mutual Adjustment of Needs and
Independence (1969) (Ph.D. Dissertation. U. of Cal. at Riverside). Moreover. as seen above, there
has been an emphasis on administrative continuity at the Mexican Commission that is unusual within
the Mexican foreign service. These indicators are at best impressionistic. but suggest that the situated
autonomy of the United States Section has served to enhance the prestige and importance of the
Mexican Section within Mexico's foreign affairsestablishznent.
69. Jamail and Mumme. supra note 6.
70. Mumme. The Background and Significance of Minute 261 of the International Boundary
Commission, II Cal. W. Int'l. L. J. 228 (1981).
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ened in the area of water apportionment and the management of salinity
along the Rio Grande and Colorado Rivers."'
The IBWC's success in matters falling within its formal jurisdiction,
however, has drawn the attention of advocates of enhanced environmental
management across the spectrum of transboundary environmental concerns. In the past decade, numerous voices have urged the Commission
to tackle solutions to air pollution, hazardous and toxic wastes, and other
environmental problems with binational implications along the international border."2 The situated character of the United States Section's
organizational autonomy is apt to prevent the Commission from tackling
these issues for several reasons. First, the agency's success is predicated
on the assertion of exclusive jurisdiction over a specific class of boundary
and water issues. The United States Section has carefully based its functional claims in the script of the 1944 Water Treaty. Moving beyond these
bounds would require a modification of that treaty or a new treaty authorizing new functions. The United States Section is not likely to support
a non-treaty extension of its functions unless the extension is tentative,
aimed at a formal protocol, and grounded in solid border state support.
Second, the United States Section has sustained its clientele support
largely due to its record of performing material services for its border
state clientele. Unlike its northern counterpart, the UC, the IBWC has
never sought to assume a major regulatory role. Moving into a broader
realm of environmental management would engage the Commission, and
the United States Section, in the business of policing domestic interests,
which would provoke controversy. It would raise the public profile of the
Commission and expose it to criticism, potentially undermining the united
front clientelism critical to its effectiveness as an agency. The leadership
of the United States Section may not be willing to expose the agency,
and the Commission, to those risks.
In sum, the United States Section is a highly effective multiple purpose
functional agency with a dual domestic and international mandate. It will
probably continue to absorb new functions within its present jurisdiction
in light of the rapid urbanization and the profusion of policy needs generated by the development of the United States-Mexico border region.
The present menu for functional expansion includes the apportionment
of unapportioned surface and groundwater along the border, further expansion in the realm of binational sanitation and sewage management,
transboundary groundwater pollution, salinity control, additional flood
control measures, and technical advising and coordination with other
domestic agencies with boundary-related functions. In 1983, the United
States-Mexico Border Environmental Cooperation Agreement provided
71.

Jamail and Mumme, supra note 6.
72. Utton, supra note 53, at 745; Bath. supra note 53, at 1165.
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further impetus in this regard." The United States Section will also continue to discharge major responsibilities in the sphere of boundary main-

tenance under the 1970 Boundary Treaty as well as operation and
maintenance of its principal reclamation and flood control works along
the border.
The IBWC and its United States Section, now a century old, is an
exceptional example of situated autonomy in the performance of an international resource management mandate. The United States Section's
limited political and policy autonomy has served the Commission well,
enabling it to functionally develop and better serve its clientele within
the limits.of the Commission's jurisdiction. This same autonomy limits
the Commission's capacity for development in certain policy directions
and provides a good case for a multi-agency approach to binational resource management. Nonetheless, at its centenary, the Commission deserves ample praise for its accomplishments and appreciation for the role
it will play for both countries into the 21st century. It is an excellent
exemplar to the world community of what can be accomplished in the
border policy arena, sovereignty and national imperatives notwithstanding.

73. Agreement on Cooperation for the protection and Improvement of the Environment in the
Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983 United States-Mexico. T.I.A.S. No. 10827; 19 Weekly Comp. Pres.
Doc. 1137; Sinclair, The Environmental Cooperation Agreement Benveen Mexico and the United
States: A Response to the PollutionProblems of the Borderlands, 19 Cornell Int'l L. J. 122 (1986).

